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Quasilegality: Khat, Cannabis and AfricaÕs Drug Laws 
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Abstract	
This	article	explores	the	concept	of	‘quasilegality’	in	relation	to	two	of	Africa’s	drug	crops:	khat	and	
cannabis.	 It	 argues	 that	 the	 concept	 is	 useful	 in	 understanding	 the	 two	 substances	 and	 their	
ambiguous	 relation	 to	 the	 statute	 books:	 khat	 being	 of	 varied	 and	 ever-changing	 legal	 status	 yet	
often	 treated	 with	 suspicion	 even	 where	 legal,	 while	 cannabis	 is	 illegal	 everywhere	 in	 Africa	 yet	
often	 seems	 de	 facto	 legal.	 The	 article	 argues	 that	 such	 quasilegality	 is	 socially	 significant	 and	
productive,	raising	the	value	of	such	crops	for	farmers	and	traders,	but	also	allowing	states	to	police	
or	not	police	these	substances	as	their	interests	and	instincts	dictate.	It	also	argues	that	there	is	no	
clear	 link	between	the	law	on	the	statute	book	and	the	actual	harm	potential	of	these	substances.	
Finally,	it	suggests	that	the	concept	has	much	wider	use	beyond	these	case-studies	of	drugs	in	Africa	
in	a	world	where	global	consensus	on	drug	policy	is	cracking,	and	where	many	other	objects	of	trade	
and	activities	find	themselves	in	the	blurred	territory	of	the	quasilegal.	
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Introduction	
Anti-drug	law	has	been	a	powerful	force	for	more	than	100	years,	colonising	statute	books	
around	 the	world.	 A	 complicated	 assemblage	 of	 good	 intentions,	 genuine	 concern,	more	
dubious	 intentions	 and	 vested	 interests	 has	 brought	 many	 substances	 into	 the	 orbit	 of	
international	 and	 national	 legal	 frameworks,	 and	 continues	 to	 do	 so.	 There	 has	 been	 an	
almost	inevitable	pattern:	if	something	gets	classed	as	a	drug,	then	soon	enough	the	law	will	
attempt	to	colonise	it,	generally	through	prohibition.	Such	a	pattern	has	perhaps	reached	its	
heights	 in	 the	 UK,	where	 recently	 an	 expansive	 ban	 on	 anything	 ‘capable	 of	 producing	 a	
psychoactive	 effect	 in	 a	 person	 who	 consumes	 it’	 (aside	 from	 the	 socially	 sanctioned	
exceptions	such	as	alcohol,	tobacco,	caffeine)	has	been	introduced	in	an	attempt	to	counter	
what	had	been	termed	‘legal	highs’.
1
		
This	 global	 force	 has	 encountered	much	 friction,	 using	 the	 terminology	 of	 Anna	 Tsing	 in	
describing	how	universalizing	forces	and	grounded	particularities	meet	 in	creative	tension,	
often	 generating	 new	 social	 forms	 in	 the	 process.
2
	 In	 the	 case	 of	 global	 drug	 law,	 the	
apparently	 universal	 logic	 of	 the	 ‘war	 on	 drugs’	 forms	 and	 unravels	 through	 interactions	
with	 particular	 locales	 or	 people.	 Such	 friction	 often	 results	 in	 traction,	 as	 pre-existing	
concerns	 about	 particular	 substances	 –	 or	 political	motives	 only	 distantly	 related	 to	 drug	
eradication	 –	 make	 such	 logic	 attractive,	 while	 allowing	 repressive	 drug	 policy	 purchase.	
Sometimes	this	collision	leads	to	excessively	enthusiastic	embrace	of	the	‘war	on	drugs’	as	
the	recent	extrajudicial	killings	in	the	Philippines	make	clear.
3
	 	Yet,	despite	this	traction,	to	
state	 an	 obvious	 point,	 prohibition	 by	 law	 has	 proven	 no	 straightforward	 recipe	 for	
eradication.	 Indeed,	 even	 the	 strongest	 states	 lack	 capacity	 to	 enforce	 these	 laws	
effectively,	while	policing	flows	of	smuggled	commodities	in	a	world	built	on	global	trade	is	
incredibly	difficult.
4
	
Friction	encountered	by	drug	 law	can	also	generate	 resistance	and	certain	 substances	are	
hard	to	definitively	depict	as	legal	or	illegal.	While	law-makers	might	try	and	fix	their	status	
under	the	law	-	and	consequently	fix	their	moral	status	as	‘bad’	-	such	substances	refuse	to	
comply,	 or	 only	 comply	 partially.	 These	 substances	 take	 on	 a	 ‘quasilegal’	 quality	 where	
moral	 and	 legal	 ambiguity	 surround	 them.	 This	 paper	 explores	 the	 quasilegality	 of	 two	
substances	in	particular	in	relation	to	Africa:	khat	and	cannabis.	Their	quasilegality	differs	–	
khat	varies	greatly	in	its	relation	to	the	statute	books	(being	legal	in	Kenya	and	Ethiopia,	but	
illegal	in	Tanzania	and	now	much	of	the	west),	but	is	often	tainted	with	illegality	even	when	
it	is	legal;	cannabis,	meanwhile,	is	universally	illegal	de	jure	in	Africa,	though	often	appears	
de	facto	legal.			
Despite	these	differences,	both	show	the	social	importance	of	quasilegality	–	legal	ambiguity	
matters:	 it	 can	 be	 socially	 and	 politically	 useful;	 it	 can	 be	 fraught	 with	 danger,	 yet	 also	
opportunity,	 for	producers,	traders	and	consumers;	 it	can	be	something	to	resist,	as	some	
3	
try	and	make	the	substance	in	question	unambiguously	illegal,	others	unambiguously	legal.	
The	quasilegality	of	these	substances	also	raises	critical	questions	about	the	future	of	drug	
law	in	Africa	and	beyond	as	the	friction	it	encounters	becomes	ever	more	disruptive	to	the	
intention	of	bringing	about	a	drug	free	world.	
This	paper	examines	 the	quasilegality	of	 khat	 and	 cannabis	 in	 turn,	before	demonstrating	
the	political,	economic	and	social	salience	of	their	legally	ambiguous	status	in	Africa.	In	the	
final	 section,	 the	 paper	 connects	 its	 case	 studies	 to	 the	 current	 flux	 in	 global	 drug	 laws	
where	‘quasilegality’	is	becoming	the	norm	in	a	number	of	ways.	First,	however,	we	look	in	
more	detail	at	the	term	‘quasilegality’	and	its	ability	to	capture	a	key	aspect	of	not	just	drugs	
like	 khat	 and	 cannabis,	 but	 other	 commodities,	 activities	 and	 even	 people	 whose	
relationship	to	the	state	and	law	is	ambiguous.	
Quasilegality	
‘Quasilegal’	 is	a	term	with	resonance	 in	a	number	of	 fields,	 from	the	study	of	 law	and	the	
state	 to	 the	 study	 of	 drugs	 and	 other	 such	 goods.	 The	 prefix	 ‘quasi’	 adds	 the	 idea	 of	
ambiguity	 to	 the	 term	 ‘legal’	 through	 its	 meaning	 of	 ‘as	 if’,	 ‘almost’	 or	 ‘seemingly’.	
Quasilegal	can	refer	to	procedures	and	rules	within	an	organisation	that	are	not	supported	
directly	 by	 state	 law,	 but	 resemble	 them	 in	 form,	 while	 also	 referring	 to	 what	 might	
elsewhere	 be	 termed	 ‘paralegal’.	 Oren	 Perez	 links	 the	 quasilegal	 to	 ‘fuzzy	 law’,	 ‘soft	 law’	
that	 lies	 between	 the	 ‘poles	 of	 lawlessness	 and	 complete	 legality’.
5
	 Such	 a	 definition	 is	
useful	 for	 our	 purposes,	 linking	 the	 term	 as	 it	 does	 to	 spaces	 where	 state	 law	 is	 often	
rivalled	by	‘semi-autonomous	social	fields’	in	the	words	of	Sally	Falk	Moore,	spaces	that	the	
substances	we	examine	travel	through	while	often	regulated	by	relationships	of	trust	more	
than	legal	contract.
6
		
The	term	also	hints	at	 the	vagueness	of	 the	 law	and	 its	 flexibility.	 In	 this	 regard	 it	 links	 to	
debates	in	criminology	regarding	the	concept	of	‘discretion’,	where	there	is	much	leeway	in	
the	 interpretation	and	application	of	 legal	 statutes.
7
	Again	 this	 leeway	 is	often	 influenced	
more	by	social	relationships	than	by	reference	to	the	law.	The	law	is	an	imprecise	tool,	so	in	
using	discretion	as	 to	whether	 to	 charge	 someone	with	an	offence	or	whether	 to	apply	a	
more	or	less	lenient	penalty,	those	who	apply	the	law	enter	into	an	ambiguous	-	quasilegal	-	
realm.	 The	 law	 and	 its	 vagueness	 is	 also	 capable	 of	 being	 corrupted	 by	 its	 protagonists,	
where	discretion	becomes	a	tool	for	indiscretion	and	discrimination.
8
	
However,	there	is	a	small	 literature	that	has	taken	up	the	term	in	relation	to	the	status	of	
psychoactive	substances.	It	refers	to	substances	that	are	generally	legal	such	as	alcohol	and	
tobacco,	but	whose	 trade	and	usage	can	become	 illegal,	 for	example,	where	 smuggled	 to	
evade	tax,	or	where	consumed	by	minors	or	after	licensing	hours.
9
	But	it	is	in	regard	to	one	
of	 the	 very	 substances	 we	 shall	 explore	 that	 the	 term	 quasilegal	 has	 become	 most	
associated:	 khat.	 In	 a	 contribution	 to	Appadurai’s	 seminal	 1986	 volume	The	 Social	 Life	 of	
Things:	 Commodities	 in	 Cultural	 Perspective,	 Lee	 Cassanelli	 wrote	 about	 khat	 within	
4	
northeast	Africa,	 its	 commodity	 chains,	 and	 its	 varying	 legal	 status.	He	argued	 that	 khat’s	
quasilegality	 meant	 that	 it	 ‘hovered	 on	 that	 indistinct	 boundary	 between	 legality	 and	
illegality’	and	lack	of	social	consensus	about	its	status	made	it	‘susceptible	to	manipulation	
for	 political	 ends’.
10
	 As	 a	 substance	 with	 ambiguous	 harm	 potential	 -	 capable	 of	 being	
defined	as	either	relatively	harmful	or	relatively	harmless	-	and	one	not	under	international	
control,	its	political	economy	spurred	producer	countries	to	defend	its	legality	(though	there	
are	 anti-khat	 voices	 within	 these	 producer	 countries	 too),	 and	 consumer	 countries	 (who	
benefit	less	economically	from	its	trade)	to	outlaw	it.	This	meant	that	in	some	jurisdictions	
khat	was	legal	and	in	others	khat	was	illegal.		
Cassanelli’s	analysis	of	khat	has	had	 influence	 in	wider	conceptions	of	 illicit	 flows	 through	
the	 work	 of	 van	 Schendel	 and	 Abraham.
11
	 They	 build	 on	 Cassanelli	 to	 argue	 that	 ‘what	
determines	legality	and	illegality	at	different	points	of	the	commodity	chain	is	the	particular	
regulatory	scale	an	object	finds	itself	in’.
12
	These	scales	are	not	just	those	of	the	state,	but	
include	 transnational	 and	 social	 regulatory	 scales.	 This	 approach	 is	 encapsulated	 by	 their	
distinction	between	the	 il/legal	and	the	 il/licit:	 il/legal	referring	to	how	states	define	these	
substances	 and	 il/licit	 referring	 to	 how	 societies	 view	 the	 substances	 as	 legitimate	 or	
otherwise	items	of	trade	and	consumption.	They	argue	that	‘students	of	illicit	practices	need	
to	begin	by	discarding	the	assumption	that	there	is	a	clear	 line	between	illicitness	and	the	
laws	of	states’.
13
	Thus,	some	substances	or	activities	are	socially	viewed	as	licit	even	though	
by	law	they	are	illegal,	and	vice	versa.	Quasilegal	can	help	capture	this	ambiguity,	and	help	
break	glib	assumptions	that	legality	maps	cleanly	onto	the	values	of	wider	society.		
Our	focus	is	on	‘quasilegality’	as	a	quality	that	comes	to	coalesce	in	particular	things,	people	
or	activities.	Coming	to	possess	such	a	quality	certainly	relies	on	the	varying	forms	of	social	
and	 legal	 regulatory	 relationships	 that	 van	 Schendel	 and	 Abraham	 focus	 upon,	 but	 is	
something	that	can	adhere	to	a	substance	through	its	associations,	and	something	that	can	
be	hard	to	shift	however	much	resistance	there	may	be	to	these	associations.	By	focusing	on	
quasilegality	in	this	way,	we	suggest	that	legal	ambiguity	is	not	just	something	that	emerges	
in	 specific	 regulatory	 regimes,	 but	 can	 be	 relevant	 even	 in	 contexts	 where	 it	 is	 either	
definitively	 legal	 or	 definitively	 illegal	 (as	 well	 as	 definitively	 licit	 or	 illicit).	 In	 a	 sense,	 in	
quasilegality,	 the	precise	wording	of	the	statute	books	 is	only	secondary	-	what	matters	 is	
how	 these	 substances	 are	 treated	 by	 those	 tasked	with	 upholding	 the	 law,	 and	 by	wider	
society.	 And	 far	 from	 simply	 being	 a	 mismatch	 between	 the	 law	 and	 its	 application,	
quasilegality	 has	 important	 implications,	 as	 we	 suggest	 through	 a	 case	 study	 of	 one	
quasilegal	 substance	 that	 is	 often	 legal	 but	 treated	 as	 illicit	 -	 khat	 -	 and	 another	 that	 is	
always	officially	illegal,	yet	treated	as	licit	-	cannabis.	
Khat	
Khat	is	the	archetypal	quasilegal	substance,	thanks	to	Cassanelli’s	1986	analysis.		It	consists	
of	the	stimulant	stems	and	leaves	of	the	shrub	Catha	edulis	(Forsk.)	which	is	found	from	the	
Middle	East	down	to	the	Eastern	Cape,	and	is	now	cultivated	intensively	in	Yemen,	Ethiopia,	
5	
Kenya,	Uganda	and	Northern	Madagascar,	and	consumed	in	that	region,	as	well	as	globally	
through	the	region’s	diasporas.	In	Kenya	the	substance	is	more	commonly	known	as	miraa.	
The	actual	harvested	commodity	varies	in	what	is	considered	edible:	in	Yemen,	Ethiopia	and	
Madagascar	often	just	the	leaves	and	tender	stem	tips	are	chewed,	whereas	in	Kenya	small	
leaves	 and	 bark	 of	 stems	 are	 chewed.	 Chemical	 analysis	 of	 khat	 has	 revealed	 several	
alkaloids,	 the	 most	 potent	 being	 cathinone,	 which	 acts	 in	 a	 similar	 manner	 to	
amphetamine.
14
	Generally,	chewing	khat	renders	one	alert	and	acts	as	a	euphoriant,	making	
it	popular	in	recreational	and	work	contexts.	A	crucial	factor	is	its	perishability:
15
	Cathinone	
rapidly	degrades	 into	a	weaker	alkaloid	post-harvest,	and	once	khat	dries	 it	 loses	potency	
and	value	(though	there	is	a	growing	international	trade	in	dried	khat).	Wherever	it	is	used,	
therefore,	consumers	usually	want	it	as	fresh	as	possible.	
Chewing	 khat	 is	 associated	with	 some	 adverse	 health	 consequences,	 though	 the	 scale	 of	
these	is	disputed	and	the	evidence	ambiguous.
16
	The	most	serious	health	concerns	include	a	
link	 between	 heavy	 consumption	 and	 cardiac	 problems,	 especially	 when	 chronic	
consumption	 is	 combined	with	other	cardiovascular	 risk	 factors,
17
	 and	an	association	with	
liver	damage	is	supported	by	a	small	number	of	cases	in	the	UK.
18
	Khat	is	also	said	to	be	the	
cause	of	a	number	of	social	harms:	it	is	linked	with	family	breakups,	as	chewers	–	generally,	
but	by	no	means	exclusively,	male	–	reportedly	spend	much	time	away	from	the	home;	and	
it	 is	 often	 cited	 as	 a	 cause	of	 unemployment,	 as	 khat	 is	 associated	with	 idleness.	 Income	
diversion	 is	 also	 seen	 as	 a	 major	 problem	 in	 countries	 such	 as	 Djibouti	 where	 a	 large	
proportion	of	household	income	is	spent	on	khat.	What	evidence	there	is	in	respect	to	social	
harms	 suggests	 demonising	 khat	 as	 their	 source	 is	 simplistic,	 falling	 into	 the	 trap	 of	
‘pharmacological	determinism’,	where	all	agency	 is	given	to	the	substance	rather	than	the	
wider	social	context.
19
		
Whether	 khat	 is	 a	 relatively	 harmless	 mild	 stimulant	 or	 an	 addictive	 curse	 on	 society	 is	
fervently	 debated,	 yet	 it	 is	 unrealistic	 to	 expect	 any	 conclusive	 assessment,	 as	with	most	
such	substances,	however	mild	–	ambiguity	reigns.
20
	There	are	‘problem	users’	who	chew	at	
the	expense	of	 food	(khat	–	 like	other	stimulants	–	reduces	appetite)	and	sleep,	making	 it	
hard	 for	 them	 to	 hold	 down	 work;	 however,	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 many	 chew	 more	
moderately	 and	with	 relatively	 few	 ill	 effects.
21
	More	 positively,	 some	 point	 to	 its	 link	 to	
cultural	identity	and	its	role	in	bringing	people	together	in	peaceful	gatherings	where	amity	
is	generated	and	advice	proffered.	 	Going	even	further,	some	have	even	described	khat	as	
playing	a	contributory	role	in	uniting	people	in	the	context	of	Somaliland’s	post-war	path	to	
peace.
22
		
It	 is	 important	to	describe	these	debates	about	khat	and	its	potential	for	medical	or	social	
harm	or	benefits,	as	its	ambiguities	in	these	regards	matter	for	how	states	treat	it	under	the	
law.	As	Cassanelli	emphasized,
23
	these	ambiguities	mean	that	policy	makers	have	been	able	
to	argue	both	for	banning	it	and	not	banning	it,	depending	on	their	instincts	or	interests	at	
any	one	 time,	ambiguity	 that	has	helped	generate	an	extremely	 varied	 international	 legal	
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situation:	although	khat	 is	not	under	 international	control,	 it	has	come	to	be	prohibited	in	
numerous	 countries	 throughout	 the	 world,	 but	 remains	 legal	 in	 others.	 The	 colonial	
government	 of	 Kenya	 attempted	 to	 prohibit	 it	 through	 what	 was	 known	 as	 the	 ‘khat	
ordinance’.
24
	 This	 law	 was	 crippled	 from	 the	 start	 by	 khat’s	 ambiguities.	 Debates	 raged	
among	colonial	officers	about	 its	addictiveness	or	otherwise	(and	which	substance	to	best	
compare	 it	 to	 –	 opium,	 gin	or	 tobacco),	while	 a	 racialised	 view	emerged	of	 khat	 harming	
pastoralists	such	as	the	Somali,	while	being	innocuous	for	agriculturalists	such	as	the	Meru	
of	 central	 Kenya	who	were	 and	 still	 are	 the	main	 cultivators	 of	 the	 crop	 in	 Kenya.	 These	
ambiguities	led	to	fuzzy	and	unworkable	law:	the	trade	of	the	substance	was	prohibited	in	
the	north	while	Meru	cultivation	and	consumption	was	protected	as	a	cultural	 right.	Bans	
imposed	 in	 the	postcolonial	era,	 including	 in	Somalia	 (which	banned	 it	 in	 the	1980s),	 also	
failed	through	lack	of	legitimacy,	ever-increasing	demand,	and	inability	to	police	multiplying	
smuggling	routes.
25
		
Since	 Cassanelli’s	 writing	 on	 khat,	 it	 has	 become	 yet	more	 ambiguous	 legally.	 Khat	 went	
global	 in	 the	 1990s	 and	 2000s	 with	 the	 spread	 of	 the	 Somali	 diaspora	 and	 consequent	
demand	 for	 the	 crop	 in	 places	 like	 Minneapolis,	 encountering	 more	 illegality	 as	 several	
Western	countries	had	banned	it	not	so	much	because	of	its	alleged	harms,	but	because	its	
individual	compounds	cathinone	and	cathine	were	scheduled	internationally	in	1988.
26
	This	
scheduling	applied	only	 to	 the	 isolated	compounds,	and	was	not	 intended	to	subject	khat	
itself	 to	 international	 control.	 Nevertheless,	 scheduling	 led	 to	 Sweden	 and	 Norway	
prohibiting	 the	 substance	 itself	 in	 1989;	 the	USA	 scheduled	 cathine	 (1988)	 and	 cathinone	
(1993),	the	Drug	Enforcement	Administration	taking	this	scheduling	to	imply	that	khat	itself	
is	scheduled	when	it	contains	these	substances.	Canada	scheduled	the	plant	itself	 in	1997,	
while	a	number	of	other	European	countries	soon	also	banned	the	substance.
27
	However,	
khat’s	exact	legal	status	and	penalties	for	those	caught	with	it	in	these	territories	is	far	from	
clear,	especially	in	the	US.	There,	defence	lawyers	often	use	the	argument	that	fair	warning	
of	khat’s	illegality	has	not	been	provided	as	khat	itself	is	not	listed	as	a	scheduled	substance	
under	 Federal	 Law,	 or	 that	 defendants	 are	 unaware	 that	 khat	 contains	 cathinone	 and	
therefore	do	not	understand	its	status.		
The	UK	has	been	the	most	recent	country	to	ban	the	substance,	in	2014,	after	a	long	review	
process	 in	 which	 the	 chief	 body	 advising	 the	 government	 on	 drug	 policy	 -	 The	 Advisory	
Council	 on	 the	Misuse	 of	 Drugs	 -	 recommended	 it	 not	 be	 banned,	 but	 the	 government,	
under	 pressure	 from	 UK-based	 Somali	 anti-khat	 activists	 and	 other	 European	 countries	
whose	illegal	khat	imports	were	routed	through	the	UK,	banned	it	anyway.
28
	Indeed,	for	the	
Conservative	Home	 Secretary	 of	 the	 time	 –	 Theresa	May	 –	 banning	 khat	was	 a	 ‘win-win’	
political	 move,	 appearing	 ‘tough	 on	 drugs’	 yet	 sympathetic	 to	 the	 plight	 of	 an	 ethnic	
minority.	 Khat	 became	 a	 ‘Class	 C’	 substance,	 a	 relatively	 low	 classification,	 but	 one	 that	
stopped	the	legal	 import	of	over	56	tonnes	of	khat	that	had	been	coming	from	Kenya	and	
Ethiopia.	 There	 have	 since	 been	 seizures,	 although	 how	 actively	 policed	 the	 substance	 is	
remains	 in	 doubt	 as	 khat	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 high	 up	 the	 list	 of	 priorities	 for	 overstretched	
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police	 forces.	 Obtaining	 khat	 is	 still	 reckoned	 reasonably	 straightforward,	 as	 some	 of	
Carrier’s	 informants	 have	 confirmed,	 and	 a	 variety	 of	 dried	 khat	 called	 graba	 appears	
increasingly	popular,	being	easier	to	smuggle,	and	said	to	remain	potent	once	rehydrated.	
While	a	standard	retail	bundle	of	khat	sold	for	£3	in	the	UK	when	legal,	now	such	a	bundle	
retails	from	£15-45,	reflecting	how	risk	has	affected	pricing.	
Thus,	while	 its	 legal	status	still	varies	greatly,	 if	anything	khat	 is	moving	towards	the	more	
illegal	 side	of	 the	spectrum,	certainly	 in	 the	West.	Yet	 in	most	producer	countries	back	 in	
Africa	 it	 remains	 de	 jure	 legal,	 although	 it	 is	 often	 treated	 as	 illegal.	 For	 example,	 its	
production	has	 risen	 in	 recent	decades	 in	Uganda	and	Madagascar,	where	 it	 is	 technically	
legal,	yet	there	are	continual	rumours	that	the	substance	is	banned	or	about	to	be	banned	
such	 is	 its	 conflation	with	other	drugs,	and	various	 local	by-laws	add	 further	ambiguity	as	
Beckerleg	relates	in	regard	to	Uganda.
29
	Indeed,	as	Beckerleg	suggests	for	Uganda,	there	is	
often	much	conflation	of	khat	and	other	drugs,	including	cannabis,	that	further	muddy	the	
waters	concerning	the	legality	of	the	substance.
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However,	in	one	jurisdiction	at	least	the	situation	appears	to	be	clarifying:	Kenya.	The	crop	
was	 long	 subject	 to	 ambiguity	 in	 Kenya	 as	 the	 government	 kept	 aloof	 from	 either	
encouraging	or	discouraging	its	production	fearing	international	disapproval,	and	in	Carrier’s	
early	research	on	the	substance	in	the	early	2000s,	there	was	sufficient	ambiguity	about	the	
substance	for	security	officers	to	once	threaten	him	with	arrest	in	the	hope	of	a	bribe	when	
they	 spotted	 him	 carrying	 some:	 they	 felt	 the	 substance	 sufficiently	 ‘quasilegal’	 that	 a	
foreigner	would	believe	them	that	it	was	in	fact	illegal.	However,	the	recent	ban	in	the	UK	
has	 ironically	made	 the	 substance	 if	 not	 ‘respectable’,	 then	 at	 least	more	 unambiguously	
legal.	This	is	because	the	Kenyan	state	came	out	in	support	of	the	crop	under	pressure	from	
Meru	growers	and	traders,	now	a	powerful	voting	bloc	since	the	introduction	of	devolution	
in	2013.	Khat	has	been	designated	an	official	cash	crop	-	something	Meru	have	campaigned	
for	 decades	 -	while	 a	 task	 force	 has	 been	 established	 to	 see	 how	 its	 farmers	 can	 further	
benefit	 from	 the	crop	and	be	protected	 from	 the	negative	effects	of	 the	ban	 in	 the	UK.
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Now	also	in	the	new	era	of	Kenyan	devolved	politics,	appealing	to	the	important	voting	bloc	
of	Meru	 County	 relies	 on	 politicians	 embracing	 khat:	 thus,	 the	 likes	 of	 Raila	 Odinga	 and	
William	Ruto	 indulge	 in	a	 little	khat	chewing	at	campaign	rallies	 in	 the	county.	This	would	
have	been	unthinkable	in	previous	times.	Thus,	paradoxically,	the	UK	ban	on	khat	has	meant	
that	in	Kenya	khat	is	less	quasilegal	than	it	used	to	be.	
Cannabis		
Our	other	case	study,	Cannabis	sativa,	needs	little	introduction	as	a	substance,	though	it	is	
important	 to	 emphasise	 that,	 like	 khat,	 there	 is	 much	 ambiguity	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 its	
harmfulness	 or	 otherwise:	 medical	 opinion	 throughout	 history	 has	 been	 polarized,
32
	 and	
remains	 so	 today,	 especially	 in	 regard	 to	 mental	 health.
33
	 Like	 khat,	 this	 also	 allows	
rhetorically-strong	arguments	to	be	made	for	either	restricting	or	liberalizing	its	markets.	
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While	not	 indigenous	 to	Africa,	 cannabis	has	 a	 long	history	on	 the	 continent,	 as	 cannabis	
traces	 on	 Ethiopian	 pottery	 from	 the	 fourteenth	 century	 reveal	 and	 research	 in	 southern	
Africa	suggests	cannabis	was	used	well	before	1500.
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	 It	was	no	doubt	introduced	through	
the	Indian	Ocean	trade	networks	and	Arabs	who	settled	on	the	eastern	African	coast,	from	
there	 percolating	 southwards	 and	 westwards.	 In	 Madagascar,	 its	 consumption	 is	 known	
from	the	mid-seventeenth	century,
35
	while	in	Central	Africa,	cannabis	was	integrated	into	a	
charismatic	movement	 known	 as	 the	Bene	Diamba	 (‘children	 of	 hemp’	 –	diamba	being	 a	
variant	of	a	common	term	for	cannabis),	whose	ceremonies	suffused	with	cannabis	smoke	
were	bemusedly	recorded	by	nineteenth	century	explorers.
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Throughout	the	region,	cannabis	was	not	just	used	for	its	intoxicating	properties,	but	also	as	
a	medicine,	and	many	 traditional	healers	–	 such	as	 the	sangoma	of	 southern	Africa	–	 still	
use	 all	 parts	 of	 the	 plant	 to	 cure	 various	 ailments.	 It	 was	 commonly	 reported	 in	 the	
literature	of	explorers	that	cannabis	was	smoked	by	warriors	before	raids,	although	its	use	
by	 praise	 singers	 and	 by	 people	 requiring	 deep	 thought	 to	 solve	 problems	 was	 also	
reported.
37
	 Despite	 the	 imposition	 of	 legal	 restrictions	 on	 cannabis	 production	 and	
consumption	in	Africa	over	the	course	of	the	twentieth	century,	 it	 is	as	ubiquitous	as	ever	
and	offers	many	farmers	a	livelihood.		
In	the	course	of	the	1950s	cannabis	use	also	expanded	in	West	Africa,	where	it	has	a	much	
shorter	 history	 than	 on	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 continent,	 having	 been	 re-introduced	 by	 soldiers	
returning	from	South	Asia	after	the	Second	World	War.	While	initially	associated	with	urban	
deviance,	 cannabis	 use	 and	 cultivation	 expanded	 to	 rural	 areas	 and	 other	 less	 marginal	
strata	of	society,	such	as	students,	and	by	the	end	of	the	1970s,	cannabis	had	established	
itself	as	the	favourite	 illegal	drug	across	West	Africa.	 In	Nigeria	-	one	of	the	 latecomers	to	
cannabis	-	the	substance	had	entered	the	cultural	mainstream	by	the	1980s,	being	used	by	a	
variety	 of	 social	 groups	 and	 in	 diverse	 social	 settings,	 such	 as	 motor	 parks,	 university	
campuses	and	in	bars	and	being	promoted	-	much	to	the	dislike	of	military	governments	-	by	
one	of	the	country’s	musical	giants,	Fela	Kuti.
38
	In	many	places	like	Nigeria,	cannabis	kept	its	
deviant	reputation	to	some	extent	but	also	came	to	be	a	symbol	of	resistance	to	the	state,	
not	least	in	Fela’s	music.		
Today,	cannabis	is	by	far	the	most	widely	consumed	and	traded	substance	deemed	illegal	by	
the	 state	 in	 Africa.	 The	 UNODC	 in	 its	 most	 recent	 large-scale	 study	 on	 cannabis	 on	 the	
continent	estimates	that	there	were	38.2	million	cannabis	users	in	2005,	7.7	percent	of	the	
15-64	aged	population.
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	 A	1999	UN	 report	on	drugs	 in	Africa	 that	 surveyed	10	 countries	
found	 cannabis	 sold	much	 cheaper	 than	bottled	beer,	making	 it	 highly	 accessible.
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	 Large	
quantities	are	seized	–	especially	in	South	Africa	and	Nigeria	–	as	international	concern	has	
meant	 that	 cannabis	 consumers	 and	 farmers	 have	 been	 the	 easiest	 targets	 for	 drug	
enforcers,	although	supply	appears	unaffected.
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Social	perceptions	of	cannabis	and	its	potential	harms	in	Africa	are	as	polarised	as	those	in	
the	west	between	those	who	see	it	as	a	‘hard	drug’	strongly	linked	to	‘madness’,	and	those	
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who	extol	its	virtues	as	a	‘herb’.	In	Ghana,	Henry	Bernstein	reports	of	young	consumers	who	
eloquently	 defend	 cannabis	 as	 ‘life-enhancing:	 good	 for	 ailments	 (asthma,	 appetite	 loss),	
reading,	 contemplation	and	 sense	of	 self	 –	 and	 sexual	 potency’.
42
	 These	 same	 consumers	
are	 very	 much	 influenced	 in	 their	 perceptions	 of	 cannabis	 by	 reggae	 culture	 and	
Rastafarianism,	which	is	a	major	factor	throughout	the	continent.
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Opposing	 views	 emanate	 from	 more	 ‘respectable’	 segments	 of	 society.	 Doctors	 and	 in	
particular	 psychiatrists	 were	 the	 first	 to	 write	 about	 the	 dangers	 of	 cannabis	 use	 in	 the	
1950s	and	its	impact	on	mental	and	social	health,	at	times	borrowing	from	western	models	
and	debates	on	addiction	and	substance	abuse.	Interestingly,	the	foremost	medical	experts	
on	substance	use	on	the	continent	had	and	still	have	an	ambiguous	idea	of	cannabis’s	harm	
potential.
44
	While	medical	experts	rarely	simply	condemned	cannabis	and	its	users,	medical	
statements	 were	 nonetheless	 interpreted	 in	 a	 more	 negative	 light	 in	 the	 media	 and	 in	
government	circles.	For	instance,	while	psychiatrists	in	Nigeria	started	to	explore	the	mental	
health	implications	of	cannabis	in	a	relatively	balanced	and	critical	way,	their	concerns	were	
often	sensationalised	in	the	media.	Military	governments	since	the	1960s	knowingly	ignored	
medical	 advice	and	 instead	 initiated	 the	most	attention-generating	and	punitive	 legal	 and	
policy	responses.
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Cannabis	 use	 is	 also	 strongly	 opposed	 by	 various	 religious	 groupings,	 such	 as	 pentecostal	
Christian	 denominations,	 which	 also	 run	 some	 of	 the	 most	 well-funded	 drug	 treatment	
centres	on	the	continent.
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	Even	in	contexts	where	cannabis	has	been	smoked	for	centuries,	
its	use	by	younger	generations	is	frowned	upon,	and	the	common	discourse	that	substance	
use	 has	 degenerated	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 loss	 of	 power	 by	 African	 elders	 can	 be	 heard,	 as	
reported	by	the	1999	UN	report	from	Mozambique.
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Legally,	cannabis	should	be	much	less	ambiguous	a	substance	than	khat,	as	it	is	universally	
controlled	under	unified	global	drug	conventions,	while	its	prohibition	is	decreed	by	statute	
in	 all	 African	 countries,	 and	 has	 been	 in	 some	 countries	 for	 over	 a	 century.	 In	 most	
countries,	 legislation	 was	 introduced	 alongside	 that	 against	 opium	 following	 the	 1925	
International	 Opium	 Convention	 (that	 also	 was	 concerned	 with	 cocaine	 and	 cannabis).	
These	 colonial	 ordinances	 were	 often	 based	 on	 imperial	 templates	 and	 responded	 to	
international	 treaties	 rather	 than	 to	 concerns	 about	 consumption	 within	 particular	
colonies.
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South	 Africa	 is	 somewhat	 distinct	 in	 this	 respect,	 as	 concern	 over	 the	 consumption	 of	
‘dagga’	 (one	of	 the	 local	names	 for	 cannabis)	has	different	historical	 roots.	Already	 in	 the	
1880s,	 use	 of	 dagga	 among	workers	 in	 the	 Natal	 Colony	 became	 an	 important	 part	 of	 a	
government	 inquiry	 on	 Indian	 indentured	 labourers.	 In	 subsequent	 decades	 South	 Africa	
became	 one	 of	 the	 leading	 proponents	 internationally	 to	 promote	 the	 prohibition	 of	
cannabis	 and	 its	 recognition	 as	 an	 internationally	 illegal	 drug	 in	 the	 1920s.	 At	 the	 time,	
South	African	government	concerns	about	dagga	were	intrinsically	linked	to	racialized	ideas	
about	the	control	of	labour	and	productivity	on	farms	and	mines.
49
	This	was	quite	different	
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from	most	other	parts	of	the	continent,	where	there	was	little	to	no	state	concern	about	the	
substance	until	the	1950s.	
Despite	 its	 overwhelming	 illegality	 since	 the	 1920s,	 cannabis	 was	 increasingly	
commoditised,	 becoming	 deeply	 embedded	 in	 rural	 economies,	 for	 example	 in	 Lesotho	
where	 Laniel	 and	 Bloomer	 analysed	 its	 rise	 in	 rural	 significance	 in	 compensation	 for	
decreasing	 opportunities	 for	 migrant	 labour	 in	 South	 Africa.
50
	 In	 other	 countries	 too	 its	
importance	was	tied	to	the	economic	uncertainties	of	the	neoliberal	economic	reforms	and	
their	often	devastating	effects	on	livelihoods.
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	 In	Nigeria	as	well	as	in	other	parts	of	West	
Africa,	the	rise	of	cannabis	was	linked	to	the	decline	in	cocoa	cultivation	and	first	appeared	
as	a	means	 to	compensate	or	diversify	agricultural	production.
52
	 In	 recent	decades,	 it	has	
become	a	key	produce	of	an	area	that	used	to	be	called	Nigeria’s	‘cocoa	belt’	and	in	many	
ways	it	is	now	more	than	a	‘compensation	crop’.
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In	 a	 context	where	 cannabis	 plays	 such	 an	 important	 role	 in	 rural	 and	 urban	 economies,	
there	are	often	few	attempts	made	to	enforce	cannabis’	de	jure	 illegality.	Nigeria’s	war	on	
drugs	since	the	1990s	 is	somewhat	exceptional	 in	this	respect,	although	also	 its	 impact	on	
the	 trade	 was	 at	 most	 marginal.
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	 In	 countries	 especially	 reliant	 on	 the	 crop	 for	 rural	
economies,	 it	 is	 more	 or	 less	 de	 facto	 legal.	 For	 example,	 in	 Lesotho	 and	 Malawi	 state	
enforcement	is	minimal,	a	state	policy	characterised	by	neglect.	Of	course,	this	neglect	also	
comes	 about	 as	 few	 states	 have	 the	 capacity	 to	 police	 cannabis	 cultivation	 and	 trade	
effectively.
55
		
Furthermore,	as	a	ubiquitous	crop	and	item	of	consumption	associated	with	medicine	and	
tradition,	as	well	as	with	popular	figures	like	Fela	Kuti,	cannabis	law	meets	much	resistance	
on	 the	 continent	 as	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 world.	 Of	 course,	 there	 are	 local	 cultures	 of	
condemnation	 too,	 especially	when	 the	 use	 of	 cannabis	 is	 linked	 to	 deviant	 and	 at	 times	
violent	 groups,	 such	as	 insurgents	 in	 the	Niger	Delta,	 or	when	 cannabis	 is	 debated	 in	 the	
context	 of	 mental	 health	 by	 doctors.	 These	 condemning	 discourses	 on	 cannabis	 in	 the	
media,	 state	and	medical	 circles,	 as	well	 as	 in	 the	general	public	have	given	cannabis	 law	
and	its	enforcement	some	traction,	as	was	the	case	in	the	Nigerian	drug	war	in	the	1990s.		
But	 like	 khat,	 cannabis	 is	 a	 substance	 that	 for	many	 in	 Africa	 has	 a	 social,	 economic	 and	
cultural	legitimacy,	and	attempts	to	definitively	fix	it	as	‘bad’	have	often	failed,	especially	if	
the	main	promoter	of	its	illegality	is	a	state	that	lacks	legitimacy.
56
	Cannabis	may	be	illegal,	
but	 for	many	 in	Africa,	as	elsewhere,	 it	 is	 far	 from	universally	condemned.	 In	 this	 context	
where	some	see	it	as	a	legitimate	source	of	livelihood	and	relief,	it	is	cannabis	law	that	can	
seem	illegitimate.		
The	social	salience	of	quasilegality	
Does	this	quasilegality	matter?	After	all,	these	two	substances	flow	fairly	freely	in	much	of	
Africa	and	beyond	despite	what	the	statute	books	say:	drug	law	is	not	only	hard	to	police,	
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especially	 for	 resource-poor	 states,	 it	 is	 also	 impossible	 to	 translate	 abstract	 law	 into	
definitive	 consensus	 about	 the	 production,	 trade	 and	 consumption	 of	 such	 substances.		
However,	 drug	 law	 still	 hangs	 over	 them,	 and	 their	 quasilegal	 and	 morally	 ambiguous	
statuses	are	socially	and	economically	consequential	in	several	respects.	
While	the	trade	and	production	of	these	commodities	have	expanded	impressively,	mostly	
without	 state	 input,	 quasilegality	 of	 course	 prevents	 governments	 from	 supporting	 these	
commodities	in	a	way	they	can	with	other	drug	crops	such	as	tea	or	tobacco.	This	situation	
has	now	somewhat	changed	in	regard	to	khat	in	Kenya,	but	generally	speaking	producers	of	
such	 crops	 have	 no	 legal	 support	 from	 the	 state.	 Meanwhile,	 underneath	 quasilegality,	
illegality	often	lies	dormant	and	latent.	For	cannabis,	its	latent	illegality	can	spring	up	to	bite	
those	who	grow	or	trade	such	goods.	For	example,	cannabis	 farmers	and	traders	 in	Africa	
are	 often	 easy	 targets	 for	 law	 enforcers	 wanting	 to	 boost	 seizure	 statistics.	 Quasilegality	
cannot	prevent	many	in	Kenya,	Nigeria	and	elsewhere	from	being	charged	and	imprisoned	
for	cannabis	crimes.
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	These	decisions	are	often	made	quite	arbitrarily	by	the	state	and	its	
police	 officers.	 Usually	 it	 is	 the	 small-scale	 producer	 and	 user	 who	 carries	 the	 can:	 as	
elsewhere,	drug	law	disproportionately	affects	the	poorest.		
Quasilegality	can	also	be	useful	for	actors	including	the	state.	The	state	can	be	lenient	in	its	
implementation	at	times,	or	even	become	complicit	 in	the	trade,	while	 it	can	be	tough	on	
these	 substances	when	 politically	 convenient,	 for	 instance	when	 increasing	 drug	 seizures	
will	gain	an	African	government	western	support,	as	was	the	case	during	Nigeria’s	war	on	
drugs	at	the	end	of	the	1990s.
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	As	already	alluded	to	by	Cassanelli,	lack	of	consensus	about	
a	 substance’s	 status	makes	 it	 ‘susceptible	 to	manipulation	 for	political	 ends’.
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	 This	 is	 not	
only	 the	 case	between	 states	on	 the	 international	 level	but	also	within	 states.	Within	 the	
context	 of	 quasilegality,	 the	 implementation	 of	 drug	 law	 has	 often	 served	 as	 a	means	 to	
extend	 state	 control,	 especially	 by	 expanding	 repressive	 law	 enforcement	 -	 often	 with	
donor-funded	equipment.
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Meanwhile,	 for	consumers	and	producers	quasilegality	 is	also	useful	 in	a	number	of	ways,	
principally	 through	 enhancing	 economic	 and	 cultural	 value.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 cannabis,	
something	 freely	 sold	 in	 much	 of	 Africa	 and	 easy	 to	 grow,	 much	 of	 its	 economic	 value	
derives	 from	 illegality	and	 the	 risk	premium	this	adds	 to	 its	 sale	price.
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	Quasilegality	also	
gives	 the	 likes	 of	 khat	 a	 value	 boost,	 as	 its	 reputation	 as	 something	 not	 ‘respectable’	 in	
wider	 society	 can	 earn	 it	 ‘respect’	 among	 sub-cultures.	 In	 this	 way,	 khat	 becomes	 more	
‘cool’	 and	more	 in	 demand	 as	 a	 commodity,	 especially	 among	 the	 young.
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	 Cannabis	 too	
gains	great	appeal	as	 its	consumption	 is	associated	with	defiance	and	counter-culture	and	
the	likes	of	famous	smokers	including	Fela	Kuti	and	Bob	Marley.	
In	another	geographical	context,	there	are	benefits	to	quasilegality,	as	Polson	makes	clear	in	
relation	 to	 cannabis	 cultivation	 in	 California.
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	 There	 cannabis’	 increasing	 legality	 for	
medicinal	usage	means	it	 is	far	more	tolerated	as	a	 ‘licit’	though	not	‘legal’	crop,	although	
producers	can	still	be	arrested	and	charged,	making	it	still	a	risky	occupation	that	attracts	a	
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premium.	 However,	 there	 are	 deep	 inequalities	 in	 who	 reaps	 rewards	 from	 this	
quasilegality,	 as	 it	 is	 those	 most	 able	 to	 distance	 themselves	 legally	 from	 the	 crop	 who	
benefit	 the	 most:	 Polson	 highlights	 how	 landowners	 who	 can	 distance	 themselves	 from	
what	tenants	were	growing	are	those	who	benefit	 the	most.	Regarding	cannabis	 in	Africa,	
we	 see	 the	 same	 happening,	 with	 growers	 of	 cannabis	 being	 the	 easiest	 targets	 for	 law	
enforcers,	yet	also	the	ones	benefitting	the	least	from	its	trade.			
However,	growers	in	California	value	cannabis’	licit	yet	illegal	status	as	this	can	protect	them	
from	‘the	predations	of	the	regulated,	competitive	market’.
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	For	farmers	in	Africa	and	other	
parts	of	the	developing	world	too,	the	ability	of	drug	crops	to	insulate	them	from	predatory	
states	 is	a	key	part	of	 their	appeal,	and	 in	 the	case	of	khat	 in	Kenya	 there	are	 those	who	
warn	 farmers	 to	 beware	 their	 longed-for	 government	 input,	 as	with	 this	might	 come	 less	
benevolent	state	attention	including	increased	taxes.	Indeed,	khat	and	cannabis	in	much	of	
Africa	appear	to	offer	producers	and	traders	the	benefits	of	a	middle-ground	between	full	
licitness	and	legality	and	competition	from	corporate	capitalism,	and	definitive	illegality	and	
the	 repressive	 consequences	 of	 consensus	 over	 their	 illicitness.	 Of	 course,	 this	 is	 a	
precarious	middle-ground.	
Importantly,	quasilegality	also	spurs	campaigns	to	more	definitively	fix	these	substances	as	
legal	or	illegal.	For	example,	khat	producers	in	Kenya	have	long	campaigned	to	validate	their	
commodity	globally	as	a	 legal	 stimulant	–	not	 just	 to	boost	 trade,	but	also	out	of	pride	 in	
their	khat	heritage;	on	the	other	hand	Somalis	campaigned	to	have	it	made	illegal	in	Britain	
not	just	out	of	concern	for	social	harms,	but	also	because	they	reckoned	a	ban	would	give	
them	 validation	 from	 the	 UK	 government	 as	 a	 community	 to	 be	 treated	 seriously.	
Furthermore,	 in	 the	 latter	 case,	we	 can	 see	how	 illegality	 elsewhere	 in	 the	world	 fed	 the	
notion	among	campaigners	that	khat	must	be	harmful:	why	would	it	be	illegal	elsewhere,	if	
not?
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	Here	we	see	an	instance	of	how	drug	law	can	help	form	public	opinion.	Meanwhile,	in	
relation	to	cannabis	 there	are	numerous	 ‘free	the	weed’	campaigns	 in	Africa,	especially	 in	
South	Africa,	but	also	in	Kenya,	where	recently	a	Member	of	Parliament	-	Ken	Okoth	-	called	
for	the	substance	to	be	legalised	so	farmers	could	profit	from	it	as	an	export	crop.
66
		
In	this	way,	quasilegality	can	be	generative	of	social	movements	that	seek	to	dispel	this	very	
quasilegality.	 Like	 the	 war	 on	 drugs	 and	 its	 universalizing	 policy,	 legalization	 and	
decriminalisation	campaigns	can	be	global	and	transnational	in	scale,	and	can	also	generate	
either	traction	or	resistance	 in	 local	contexts.	As	the	next	section	discusses,	 in	our	current	
era	such	campaigns	are	apparently	gaining	traction.		
Cracks	in	the	system		
Thus,	 the	 quasilegality	 of	 these	 substances	 and	 others	 like	 them	matters.	 In	 this	 regard,	
quasilegality	 is	becoming	more	common	 for	drugs	around	 the	world	as	 the	global	 logic	of	
the	drug	war	both	loses	and	gains	traction	depending	on	the	substance	and	the	jurisdiction.	
The	experiments	of	Uruguay,	 Colorado	 and	Washington	 in	 regard	 to	 cannabis	 legalisation	
13	
suggest	 a	 loss	 of	 traction	 of	 the	 global	 drug	 policy	 regime,	 as	 do	 increasingly	 vocal	
international	 initiatives	 pushing	 for	 drug	 law	 reform.	 There	was	much	 optimism	 that	 the	
United	Nations	General	 Assembly	 Special	 Session	 (UNGASS)	 on	 global	 drug	 policy	 in	 April	
2016	would	culminate	in	concrete	change.
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	This	session	was	pushed	through	by	countries	
in	the	global	south	that	have	long	suffered	through	more	repressive	drug	policy,	especially	
in	 Latin	America	where	drug	 control	 has	 long	been	militarized.
68
	However,	 the	end	 result	
was	disappointing	 for	 reformers,	as	more	 reactionary	 forces	were	able	 to	promote	hardly	
revolutionary	 recommendations.
69
	 Thus,	 the	drug	war	 is	 fighting	back.	Nonetheless,	 there	
are	strong	arguments	that	we	are	witnessing	the	fracturing	of	the	 international	consensus	
on	 drug	 law	 that	 has	 been	 in	 place	 since	 the	 1920s,	 particularly	 on	 such	 substances	 as	
cannabis.
70
		
While	 repressive	measures	 against	 drugs	 continue,	 and	 the	 recent	 horrors	 perpetrated	 in	
the	 Philippines	 show	 how	 anti-drug	 law	 remains	 a	 popular	 means	 of	 social	 control	 for	
autocratic	leaders	such	as	Duterte,	perhaps	the	general	tenor	is	towards	more	liberal	policy.	
In	Europe,	Portugal	is	held	as	a	case	study	of	effective	decriminalisation		-	another	form	of	
quasilegality.	 In	 the	UK,	 a	number	of	police	 forces	have	over	 the	 last	 few	years	 retreated	
from	active	policing	of	small	amounts	of	cannabis	possession:
71
	cannabis	has	thus	become	
more	quasilegal	there	too.	In	South	America,	coca	also	finds	itself	increasingly	quasilegal	as	
global	anti-drug	initiatives	lose	traction	in	a	local	context	where	many	validate	the	crop	and	
its	consumption	culturally	and	many	depend	on	it	economically.
72
	
Yet	 the	 drug	 war	 has	 perhaps	 gained	 traction	 in	 regard	 to	 khat,	 as	 witnessed	 by	 its	
increasing	illegality	in	the	west.	While	cannabis	moves	away	from	illegality,	the	arguably	less	
harmful	 khat	 is	 pulled	 more	 towards	 it,	 and	 the	 story	 of	 other	 substances	 –	 including	
synthetic	 legal-highs	and	 increasingly	tobacco	–	suggest	there	remains	a	powerful	 impetus	
towards	restrictive	drug	law.	Of	course,	the	situation	is	more	nuanced	than	this	suggests,	as	
we	have	also	seen	khat	becoming	more	licit	in	Kenya	itself,	and	less	quasilegal.		
However,	in	regard	to	our	two	case-study	substances,	perhaps	a	wider	generalization	can	be	
made,	 in	 that	khat	has	become	 illegal	 in	western	countries	where	 it	 is	used	principally	by	
minority	 populations,
73
	while	 cannabis’s	 illegality	 is	 ever	more	 questioned	 as	 its	 use	 is	 so	
well	 ingrained	 into	wider	western	 society.	As	 ever,	 there	 are	 far	more	powerful	 forces	 at	
work	in	the	shaping	of	drug	policy	than	simple	evaluations	of	harmfulness	or	harmlessness.	
Some	 of	 these	 forces	 are	 economic	 in	 nature,	 and	 other	 states	 around	 the	world	will	 be	
monitoring	 the	 results	 of	 cannabis	 legalization	 in	 places	 like	 Colorado	 and	 the	 apparent	
economic	boosts	to	legal	businesses	and	states	that	can	come	from	such	policy.
74
	
Thus,	 global	drug	policy	 is	 itself	 increasingly	 ambiguous,	 and	how	 this	will	 play	out	 in	 the	
African	context	remains	to	be	seen.	There	is	talk	of	legalising	medical	marijuana	in	Rwanda	
and	 the	 South	 African	 parliament	 has	 recently	 considered	 a	 similar	 proposal.
75
	 A	 less	
repressive	 drug	 policy	 is	 being	 seriously	 considered	 by	 the	 West	 Africa	 Commission	 on	
Drugs,	 although	 some	 countries	 remain	 wedded	 to	 harsher	 policies.	 There	 are	 of	 course	
14	
many	 voices	 in	 Africa	 as	 elsewhere	 urging	 that	 rather	 than	 making	 drugs	 like	 khat	 and	
cannabis	more	unambiguously	legal,	they	should	be	made	more	unambiguously	illegal.	
So	despite	growing	cracks	in	the	landscape	and	logic	of	global	drug	policy,	cannabis	and	khat	
are	likely	to	remain	decidedly	ambiguous	and	quasilegal	for	the	foreseeable	future,	on	the	
African	as	well	as	the	international	level.	Their	quasilegality	helps	to	understand	the	traction	
that	 drug	 laws	 and	 drugs	 more	 generally	 have	 in	 political	 and	 popular	 debates	 on	 the	
continent,	as	elsewhere	–	debates	that	are	not	simply	about	the	pharmacological	effects	or	
the	medical	and	social	harms	of	psychoactive	substances,	but	about	their	broader	roles	 in	
helping	 to	define	 inter-generational	 conflicts,	 the	 labeling	of	migrant	 communities	or	as	a	
way	to	debate	such	contested	ideas	as	development	or	national	identity.
76
		
As	a	concept,	quasilegality	 is	compelling	as	 it	 captures	 the	 fluidity	of	 the	evolution,	 status	
and	 perceptions	 of	 these	 substances	 over	 time,	 helping	 to	 explore	 the	 extensive	 hidden	
spaces	 between	 the	 legal	 and	 illegal,	 where	much	 drug-related	 activity	 and	 debate	 takes	
place.	Yet	it	is	also	has	strong	potential	as	a	concept	in	analyzing	other	areas	of	policy	and	
law	making	characterised	by	ambiguity	and	fluidity.	These	 include	other	aspects	of	society	
where	the	 law	attempts	to	stamp	out	things	and	activities	deemed	 illegal	yet	regarded	by	
many	 as	 ‘licit’,	 from	 sex	 work	 and	 migration	 to	 so-called	 ‘radicalization’.	 It	 is	 in	 this	
ambiguous	 space	 of	 the	 quasilegal	 where	 the	 law	 sometimes	 gains	 traction,	 but	 is	 ever	
susceptible	to	wider	social	values	and	desires.	
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